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This paper focuses on sharing the costs and revenues of maintaining a public network commu-
nication structure. Revenues are assumed to be bilateral and communication links are publicly
available but costly. It is assumed that agents are located at the vertices of an undirected
graph in which the edges represent all possible communication links. We take the approach
from cooperative game theory and focus on the corresponding network game in coalitional form
which relates any coalition of agents to its highest possible net bene…t, i.e., the net bene…t cor-
responding to an optimal operative network. Although …nding an optimal network in general is
a di¢cult problem, it is shown that corresponding network games are (totally) balanced. In the
proof of this result a speci…c relaxation, duality and techniques of linear production games with
committee control play a role. Su¢cient conditions for convexity of network games are derived.
Possible extensions of the model and its results are discussed.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper analyzes an allocation problem associated to maintaining a communication network
between various economic agents. Communication links are widely observed in reality and our
framework applies to many such situations like telecommunication, utilities, computer networks
and information technology. The latter application is particularly interesting as …rms increasingly
invest in information technology equipment to improve …rm-wide availability of divisional-speci…c
(or lower-level) information. In principle the model assumes that all links within the underlying
communication network are publicly available apart from possible exogenously determined restric-
tions. The use of a link however is assumed to be costly: a …xed cost is imposed on each link
independent who exactly is using this particular link to establish communication. Next to these
communication costs there are also revenues from communication. These revenues are assumed to
be bilateral, i.e., the actual revenues of a group of agents is determined as the sum of the revenues
of the pairs of those agents within this group who can directly or indirectly communicate via a
sequence of communication links whose costs are accounted for by the group as a whole. If a group
of agents chooses a particular subnetwork to be operative by paying the corresponding communi-
cation costs, this implicitly determines the total bene…ts from communication within this group.
So the problem the agents face is to …nd an optimal operative network, i.e., an operative network
with highest possible net bene…ts. Moreover, next to this optimization problem the agents also face
an allocation problem: how to divide the net bene…ts of an optimal operative network among the
agents?
Our setting constitutes a typical example in which the fundamental economic issue of cost
and revenue allocation resulting from a cooperative endeavor takes place in the context of discrete
optimization on networks (cf. Sharkey (1991)). The analysis will incorporate and intermingle
techniques from optimization and cooperative game theory. Related literature with respect to
restricted cooperation possibilities based on exogenous communication graphs was initiated by
Myerson (1977), for a survey we refer to Slikker,van den Nouweland (2001). Closely related within
this stream of literature is Slikker, van den Nouweland (2000) on network formation with costs for
establishing links. There, however, the costs per link are assumed to be identical and the focus is
not on a bilaterally based revenue structure. In our framework this means that the optimization
problem with respect to …nding the optimal operative communication network is relatively easy to
solve. In the same spirit as this paper on determining optimal operative networks and allocating
the corresponding net bene…ts are e.g. Claus,Kleitman (1973) and Granot, Huberman (1981) on
minimum cost spanning tree problems and games. In our setting, however, the focus is not solely2
on costs but to …nd in some sense an optimal compromise between maximizing joint revenues and
minimizing joint costs.
The paper incorporates two main results. The …rst result is that the core of a network game,
i.e. a cooperative game in coalitional form in which the value of a coalition equals the maximal net
bene…ts of communication, is non-empty. This implies that core-allocation exists and that these
allocations induce stable cooperation in the sense that no subgroup can improve their individual
payo¤s by establishing a communication network on their own. The proof of this result nicely com-
bines the OR-techniques of relaxation and duality with a game theoretic technique of constructing
core elements similar to the one used in Curiel, Derks, Tijs (1989) within the context of linear
production situations (cf. Owen (1975)) with committee control.
The second result provides su¢cient conditions on the network situation such that the correspond-
ing network game is convex. The proof involves relations between optimal networks of various
coalitions. The interest in convexity is motivated by the nice properties these games possess. For
example, for convex games the core is equal to the convex hull of all marginal vectors (cf. Shapley
(1971) and Ichiishi (1992)), and , as a consequence, the Shapley value is the bary centre of the
core (Shapley (1971)). Moreover, the bargaining set and the core coincide, and the kernel coincides
with the nucleolus (cf. Maschler, Peleg, Shapley (1972)). The proof is obtained by establishing
relation between optimal networks of various coalitions.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formalizes network situations and its associated
cooperative games. Total balancedness of network games is shown in Section 3. Section 4 focuses
on convexity. In general network games need not be convex. Su¢cient conditions for convexity of
the underlying situation are derived. Possible extensions of the model and its results, in particular
with respect to directed graphs and the incorporation of public nodes are discussed in Section 5.
An appendix contains the more technical proofs.
2N e t w o r k g a m e s
We will model the agents’ decision problem regarding the use of a public communication network as
a cooperative TU-game. A TU-game is a pair (N;v) with N representing the …nite set of agents and
v :2 N ! IR the characteristic function describing the gains of cooperation v(S) for each coalition
S µ N. By assumption it holds that v(;)=0 . The core of a cooperative game (N;v) is the set of
allocations of v(N) for which no subcoalition S has an incentive to part company with the grand
coalition N because it can do better on its own. Core allocations thus induce stable cooperation.
The core C(v) is de…ned as C(v)=fx 2 IR Nj8SµN :
P
i2S xi ¸ v(S);
P
i2N xi = v(N)g.Ag a m e3
(N;v) is called balanced if the core is nonempty. In particular, (N;v) is called totally balanced if
t h ec o r eo fe a c hs u b g a m e(S;vjS) is nonempty, where vjS(U)=v(U) for all U µ S.
For de…ning network games, let N denote a …nite set of agents. The revenues of communication
between two agents i and j are denoted by bfi;jg,w i t hbfi;jg ¸ 0.L e tEµf f i;jgji;j 2 N;i 6= jg
denote the set of available (communication) links. The cost of using the link fi;jg2Eis denoted by
kfi;jg,w i t hkfi;jg ¸ 0. Whenever we write fi;jg it is implicitly assumed that i 6= j, an assumption
that holds in the whole paper and which is adopted to avoid unnecessary notational inconveniences.
For communication, coalition S µ N has the links E(S) µEat its disposal. Note that it may
be possible that a coalition S is allowed to use links that involve agents outside S. So, agents i and
j do not necessarily possess the ownership rights of the link fi;jg in the sense that this link can
only be used by other agents with the permission, i.e. cooperation, of agents i and j.W em a k et h e
following natural assumptions:
(i) E connects all players in N,
(ii) if S µ T,t h e nE(S) µE(T),
(iii) E(N)=E.
Two special networks can be viewed as two extreme situations. First, if each coalition can use
all available links, i.e. E(S)=E for all S 2 2N, the network is called fully public. Second, if each
coalition can only use links that connects players in that coalition, i.e.,
E(S)=E\f f i;jgji;j 2 Sg for all S 2 2N, the network is called fully private.
A possible operative network for a coalition S µ N is represented by a subset E µE (S).Ac o m -
munication link fi;jg is used and paid for if and only if fi;jg2E. Consequently, the total costs
of the network E equal
P
fi;jg2E kfi;jg. Agents i;j 2 S can communicate with each other in the
network E if there exists a path from agent i to agent j.B y d e … n i n g Cfi;jg(E)=1if agents i
and j can communicate with each other in E and Cfi;jg(E)=0otherwise, the total revenues from
communication in the network E equal
P





fi;jg2E kfi;jg. Because each coalition maximizes the bene…ts of
cooperation, the corresponding cooperative network game (N;v) is de…ned by








for all S µ N.4
Example 2.1 Consider the network given in Figure 2.1 with N = f1;2;3;4g and E = ffi;jgji;j 2
Ng. Each link fi;jg comes with two numbers, the bold faced number represents the revenues bfi;jg
of communication between agents i and j while the italic faced number represents the costs kfi;jg

















Figure 2.1: A network situation.
To illustrate the e¤ect of the set E(S) of available links on the corresponding game, de…ne
E1(S)=ffi;jgji;j 2 Sg for all S µ N. So, each coalition S µ N can only use links that
connect agents in S, i.e., we have a fully private network. For coalition f1;3g this means that
E1(f1;3g)=ff1;3gg.S i n c e bf1;3g ¡ kf1;3g < 0, coalition f1;3g will not use the link f1;3g so
that in the corresponding game v1 we have that v1(f1;3g)=0 . Coalition f1;2;3g has the links
E1(f1;2;3g)=ff1;2g;f1;3g;f2;3gg at its disposal. Maximal bene…ts are obtained if they use the
links f1;2g and f2;3g,s ov1(f1;2;3g)=bf1;2g + bf1;3g + bf2;3g ¡ kf1;2g ¡ kf2;3g =1 1 . In a similar
way one obtains that v1(S)=2if S 2f f 2;3g;f3;4g;f1;4gg, v1(S)=0if S 2f f 2;4g;f1;2gg,
v1(f1;2;4g)=2 , v1(f1;3;4g)=1 4 , v1(f2;3;4g =4 ,a n dv1(f1;2;3;4g)=1 8 . Note that in the
optimal network for coalition f1;2;3;4g the links f1;4g, f2;3g,a n df3;4g are used.
Next, de…ne E2(S)=E for all S µ N, i.e., a fully public network situation. Since coalition
f1;3g now can use the links f1;4g and f3;4g, the maximal bene…ts that they can obtain equal
v2(f1;3g)=bf1;3g ¡ kf1;3g ¡ kf3;4g =6 . Note that v2(f1;3g) >v 1(f1;3g). I nas i m i l a rw a yo n e
obtains that v2(S)=v1(S) for all S µ Nnf1;3g.
3 Total balancedness
For Example 2.1 determining an optimal communication network is straightforward as the number
of possible networks that need to be considered is relatively low. As the number of agents increases
though, the number of possible networks grows exponentially, making the discrete optimization5
problem in (1) more complex. The following game (N;w) considers a relaxation of the optimization
problem and coincides with the network game (N;v). For all S µ N de…ne w(S) by


















xECfi;jg(E) · 0 for all fi;jgµN
yfi;jg · ufi;jg(S) for all fi;jgµN
xE · uE(S) for all E µE
xE ¸ 0 for all E µE
yfi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN
where (N;ufi;jg) is the unanimity game for coalition fi;jg,t h a ti sufi;jg(S)=1if fi;jgµS and
ufi;jg(S)=0otherwise, and (N;uE) i st h eg a m ed e … n e db yuE(S)=1if E 2E(S) and uE(S)=0
otherwise. Note that in an optimal solution it holds that yfi;jg =m i n f
P
EµE(S)xECfi;jg(E);u fi;jg(S)g


















s.t. 0 · xE · 1 for all E µE(S):
(3)
This game can be interpreted as a more dynamic version of the original game, in which the
bene…ts do not only depend on whether or not communication takes place but also on the duration
of the communication in an in…nite horizon setting. For this, let bfi;jg denote the revenues of
communication per time unit and let kfi;jg denote the operational cost per time unit of the link
fi;jg. Suppose further that each network E µEcan be maintained with a certain reliability
xE 2 [0;1]. The interpretation is that the network E is down (1 ¡ xE) percent of the time due
to repair. Repair is costless but takes some time during which the agents cannot communicate
via the network E. To illustrate, consider the network E = ffi;jgg that enables communication
between agents i and j.L e txE be the reliability of E.T h e n(1 ¡ xE) percent of the time agents
i and j cannot communicate because the network is down. As a result, the average revenue from
communication per time period equals xfi;jgbfi;jg. Similarly, since the network is in operation for
xfi;jg percent of time, the average operational cost per time period equals xfi;jgkfi;jg. More general,
suppose that agents i;j 2 S are connected in the networks E1;E 2 µE (S), which are maintained
with reliability xE1 and xE2, respectively. Since (1 ¡ xE1) percent of the time the network E1 is
down, agents i and j can communicate with each other through the network E1 for xE1 percent of
the time. Hence, communication via the network E1 yields agents i and j an average revenue per
time period of xE1bfi;jg. Similarly, communication via the network E2 yields an average revenue6
per time period of xE2bfi;jg.S i n c e a g e n t s i and j can not communicate more than 100 percent
of the time and we consider an in…nite horizon, the average total revenue per time period can
be set to minfxE1 + xE2;1gbfi;jg. Similarly, the average operational costs per time period equal
xE1
P
fs;tg2E1 kfs;tg + xE2
P
fs;tg2E2 kfs;tg. Summarizing, (3) expresses that each coalition S µ N
wants to maximize the net average bene…ts (per time unit) over the reliabilities of the networks
E µE(S) that they can use. Obviously, the maximal average bene…ts (per time unit) equals at least
the maximal bene…ts a coalition can obtain in the static case, i.e. v(S), because they can always
choose the network that maximizes (1) with reliability 1 and all other networks with reliability 0.
The following proposition states the converse is also true. The proof of this proposition can be
found in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.1 For each S µ N it holds that v(S)=w(S).
The game (N;w) as de…ned in (2) closely resembles the formulation of linear production games
with committee control as considered by Curiel, Derks, Tijs (1989). Linear production games were
introduced in Owen (1975) and describe the bene…ts of cooperation when agents combine their
individual resource bundles to produce and subsequently sell commodities. Curiel, Derks, Tijs
(1989) extended this model to linear production situations with committee control, where resource
bundles may be controlled by coalitions instead of individuals. They showed that linear production
games with committee control have a nonempty core if the cooperative games describing the re-
sources are simple games with nonempty cores. To illustrate the similarity, consider, for instance,
the variable yfi;jg. The ‘resources’ for yfi;jg are described by the unanimity game (N;ufi;jg),t h a t
is coalition S has an amount 1 of the resource yfi;jg if fi;jgµS a n da na m o u n tz e r oo t h e r w i s e .
This means that for coalition S it holds true that yfi;jg · ufi;jg(S).N o t et h a tt h eg a m e(N;ufi;jg)
has a nonempty core. Similarly, we have that xE · uE(S). So, for the reliability of the network
E 2E, the ’resources’ are described by the game (N;uE) with uE(S)=1if and only if E 2E(S).
This game, however, is not balanced if, for example, E(S)=E for all S µ N.S o ,t h eg a m ed e … n e d
in (2) does not meet the balancedness conditions of Curiel, Derks, Tijs (1989). Nevertheless, the
same type of techniques as in Curiel, Derks, Tijs (1989) c a nb eu s e dt os h o wt h a tt h eg a m e(N;w),
and hence (N;v), has a nonempty core.
Theorem 3.2 The network game (N;v) is totally balanced.7




E)EµE of the dual program with respect to w(N):








s.t.: ¸fi;jg + ¹fi;jg ¸ bfi;jg; for all fi;jgµN
X
fi;jgµN
¹fi;jgCfi;jg(E) · ºE +
P
fi;jg2E kfi;jg for all E µE
¸fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN
¹fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN
ºE ¸ 0 for all E µE:
(4)




fi;jg, i 2 N, is a core-allocation for the
game (N;v).
In its present formulation the dual program (4) consists of
2n(n ¡ 1) + 2jEj variables and n(n ¡ 1) + 2jEj restrictions. It includes a variable and a restriction
f o re a c hn e t w o r kE 2E. Since the number of possible networks can be very large, this program is
not (very) practical to solve. We can reduce the number of variables and restrictions to 1
2n(n ¡ 1)
and 2n, respectively.
A coalition S µ N is called connected if S is connected in the graph (N;E(S)). For a connected














¹fi;jg · ·(S) for all connected S µ N
¹fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN





G i v e na no p t i m a ls o l u t i o n(¹¤
fi;jg)fi;jgµN of the optimization problem (5), a core-allocation now




fi;jg) for all i 2 N. Furthermore, notice that an
equal distribution of bfi;jg ¡ ¹¤
fi;jg is not necessary to obtain a core-allocation, any nonnegative
distribution su¢ces.8
Each optimal solution of the dual program (5) results in core-allocations for the corresponding
network game by varying the nonnegative distribution of the pairwise net bene…ts bfi;jg ¡ ¹¤
fi;jg.
However, not every core-allocation can be obtained in this way. The following example shows that
the core can be much larger than the allocations that arise from optimal dual solutions.
Example 3.4 Consider the network in Figure 3.1. We assume that E(S)=ffi;jgji;j 2 Sg for all
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Figure 3.1: A 3-person network.
The resulting network game (N;v) is given by v(fig)=0for all i 2 N, v(f1;2g)=2 , v(f1;3g)=




f2;3gg of the dual program (5).
v(N)=bf1;2g + bf1;3g + bf2;3g ¡ max
¹fi;jg
¹f1;2g + ¹f1;3g + ¹f2;3g
s.t.: ¹f1;2g · 10
¹f1;3g · 1
¹f2;3g · 1
¹f1;2g + ¹f1;3g + ¹f2;3g · 2
¹fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN;
is given by Conv(f(2;0;0);(1;1;0);(0;1;1)g). All core-allocations corresponding to optimal dual
solutions are depicted in Figure 3.2.9
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Figure 3.2: The core of a network game.
As Figure 3.2 illustrates, not all core-allocations are supported by optimal dual solutions. This
‘de…ciency’ is caused by the fact that core-allocations based on optimal dual solutions give each
pair of connected agents i and j their bene…ts of communication bfi;jg minus some part of the total
costs of the optimal network that they have to pay. Since in our example, the optimal network
costs 2, the pair f1;2g receives at least bf1;2g ¡ 2=1 0 , which is much more than they can obtain
on their own, i.e. v(f1;2g)=2 . To make a cheap connection, the pair of agents 1 and 2 need the
cooperation of agent 3. Agent 3, however, does not pro…t from the additional bene…ts that the pair
f1;2g m a k e si nt h i sw a y ,i ft h ea l l o c a t i o ni sb a s e do na no p t i m a ld u a ls o l u t i o n .
4C o n v e x i t y
This section considers two special classes of network situations that yield convex network games.
Both focus on network situations in which the underlying graph is a tree. As before, a public
network situation is called fully public if E(S)=E for all S µ N.I t i s c a l l e d fully private if
E(S)=E\f f i;jgg j i;j 2 Sg.
Before we present the convexity result, we recall the de…nition of a convex game. A game (N;v)
is called convex if for k 2 N and any S µ T µ Nnfkg it holds
v(T [f kg) ¡ v(T) ¸ v(S [f kg) ¡ v(S):
The following example illustrates that both fully public and private network games need not be
convex.10
Example 4.1 Consider the network presented in Example 2.1. The fully public network game
(N;v1) is not convex since
v1(f1;3;4g) ¡ v1(f1;3g)=1 4¡ 6 > 18 ¡ 11 = v1(f1;2;3;4g) ¡ v1(f1;2;3g):
Similarly, the fully private network game (N;v2) is not convex since
v2(f1;3;4g) ¡ v2(f1;3g)=1 4¡ 0 > 18 ¡ 11 = v2(f1;2;3;4g) ¡ v2(f1;2;3g):
For network situations in which the available communication links form a tree, the fully public
and fully private case leads to a convex network games.
Theorem 4.2 For any fully public or private network situation in which E is a tree, the corre-
sponding network game is convex.
For the proof of this theorem we refer to the Appendix. The driving lemma is the following.
Lemma 4.3 Consider a network situation where E is a tree. Let S µ T µ N.I fD is an optimal
network for S and F is and optimal network for T,t h e nD [ F is also optimal for T.
In particular, Lemma 4.3 implies that within a network situation where E is a tree, any optimal
network for a speci…c coalition S can be extended to an optimal operational network for a larger
coalition containing S. Note that with respect to the network of Example 4.1 this is not the case
for e.g. S = f1;2;3g in both the fully public and private setting.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In network games, the structure of the revenues of communication have a bilateral additive struc-
ture; there are no synergies or positive/negative external e¤ects of communication. Similar to
Myerson (1977), one could describe the revenues of communication by a cooperative TU-game
(N;b) with the interpretation that b(S) equals the revenues of communication for coalition S µ N.
The corresponding spanning network game (N;vb) is then de…ned by








for all S µ N,w h e r eC(E) denotes the connected components of N in the network E. The core of
s u c hag a m e ,h o w e v e r ,c a nb ee m p t y ,e v e ni ft h eg a m e(N;b) has a nonempty core, as the following
example shows.11
Example 5.1 Let N = f1;2;3g;E = ffi;jgji;j 2 Ng and let b(fig)=0for all i 2 N, b(f1;2g)=
b(f1;3g)=b(f2;3g)=4 ,a n db(f1;2;3g)=6 . Note that the core of the game (N;b) equals
f(2;2;2)g. Next, let the maintenance costs of the links be equal to one, that is kfi;jg =1for all
fi;jgµN and take E(S)=ffi;jgji;j 2 Sg for all S µ N. Then the corresponding network
game (N;vb) equals vb(fig)=0for all i 2 N, vb(f1;2g)=vb(f1;3g)=vb(f2;3g)=3 ,a n d
vb(f1;2;3g)=4 . The core of this game is empty.
Note that Example 5.1 features negative external e¤ects of communication since b(f1;2;3g) <
b(f1;2g)+b(f1;3g)+b(f2;3g). The following example shows that also in the positive externality
case with C(b) 6= ;, the corresponding network game may not be balanced.
Example 5.2 Let N = f1;2;3;4g;E = ffi;jgji;j 2 Ng and let b(fig)=0for all i 2 N,
b(S)=2if jSj =2 , b(S)=9if jSj =3 ,a n db(f1;2;3;4g)=1 3 . Note that the game (N;b) satis…es
b(S) ¸
P
fi;jgµS b(fi;jg) for all S µ N. Next, let the maintenance costs of each link be kfi;jg =4 ,
and take E(S)=ffi;jgji;j 2 Sg for all S µ N. Then the corresponding network game (N;vb)
equals vb(S)=0if jSj·2, vb(S)=1if jSj¸3. The core of this game is empty while the core of
the game (N;b) is nonempty.
From the examples above it follows that the structure of the revenues b(S);S µ N, requires
more than just balancedness to induce stable cooperation in network games. A su¢cient condition
is additivity, that is b(S)=
P
fi;jgµS b(fi;jg).
A second extension concerns the characteristics of communication links. In the present model
communication links are undirected. Dependent on the underlying situation, directed links may
be more appropriate to consider, for instance when the links in the network represent railroad or
motor tra¢c. Our results on network games extend straightforwardly to directed networks.
The …nal extension introduces public nodes. To illustrate, consider the network presented in
Figure 5.1 with three agents and one public node. In the absence of the public node, the minimum
cost spanning tree for the agents 1, 2,a n d3 costs 2
p
2. If, however, they can also use the links
that connect to the public node, the minimum cost spanning tree is less expensive at 22
3. Public
nodes have a practical meaning in network games as they can represent, for instance, switchboards
in a telephone network or switches in railroads.
For the inclusion of public nodes in our model, let M with N \ M = ; denote the …nite set of
public nodes and de…ne Eµf f i;jgji;j 2 N [ Mg as the set of available links. In particular, let
E(S) µEbe the available links for coalition S µ N and make the same basic assumptions as in
Section 2. Notice that we do not assume that each coalition can use all existing links with public12
Figure 5.1: Public nodes in a network.
nodes. In that sense, the term public node may be somewhat misleading. The extended network
game (N;vp) is now de…ned by by








for all S µ N. Note that the agents do not obtain any bene…ts from connections with public nodes.
Only connections with other agents might be pro…table. It can be shown that the corresponding
network game is totally balanced.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The proof consists of three steps. In the …rst step, we reformulate
the optimization problem (2) based on some properties of the optimal solution. In the second step,
we show that there exists an optimal solution of (2) in which the reliability xE¤ of a given optimal
network E¤ µE(S) with respect to (1) is equal to one. Hence, we may assume that xE¤ =1 .In the
third step we then show that there exists an optimal solution of (2) in which xE =0for all other
networks E µE(S) with E 6= E¤,s ot h a tw(S)=v(S).
Let S µ N. Consider the linear program as formulated in (2). Since xE =0for all E 6µ E(S) we








fi;jg2Eq kfi;jg if p<q .
So, E1 is an optimal network with respect to (1). Further, de…ne Kp =
P
fi;jg2Ep kfi;jg for each
p 2f 1;2;:::;rg.




for all fi;jgµN, where xp is a short
notation for xEp. Furthermore, since each yfi;jg has a nonnegative contribution to the objective





fi;jgµN.H e n c e ,











xpCfi;jg(Ep) · 0 for all fi;jgµN
yfi;jg · ufi;jg(S); for all fi;jgµN
xp · 1 for all p 2f 1;2;:::;rg
xp ¸ 0 for all p 2f 1;2;:::;rg




































De…ne the function R : IR r

















for each x 2 IR r
+,s ot h a tw(S)=m a x fR(x)j0 · xp · 1; 8p2f1;2;:::;rgg.F u r t h e r m o r e , n o t i c e
that R(ep), where ep 2 IR r
+ is de…ned by ep
q =1if q = p and ep
q =0otherwise, equals the
net total bene…ts of the network Ep, i.e. revenues minus costs. So, by de…nition we have that
R(e1) ¸ R(e2) ¸ :::¸ R(er) and v(S)=R(e1). Hence, it is su¢cient to show that w(S)=R(e1).
Next, we show that it is optimal to take x1 =1 .L e t x 2 IR r
+ be such that x1 < 1.W e
distinguish two cases:
Pr
p=1 xp < 1 and
Pr
p=1 xp ¸ 1.
If
Pr




















































Hence, each vector x with
Pr
p=1 xp < 1 yields lower bene…ts than the vector e1.
If
Pr
p=1 ¸ 1 and x1 < 1,t h e nt a k ey 2 IR r
+ such that y1 =1and yp 2 [0;x p] such that
Pr
p=2(xp ¡ yp)=1¡ x1. So, the increase from x1 to y1 =1is compensated by decreasing xp to yp










































































































































































































































































where the …rst inequality follows from a ¡ minfb;1g¸a ¡ 1 for all a;b 2 IR and
minfa;1g¡minfb;1g¸a¡b if a · b; the subsequent equality follows from
Pr
p=2 yp ¡xp = x1 ¡1
and the last inequality follows from yp ¡ xp · 0 and R(e1) ¸ R(ep) for all p 2f 2;3;:::;rg.
So, there exists an optimal solution for which x1 =1 . What remains to show is that R(e1) ¸16
R(x) for all x 2 IR r































































































where the …rst inequality follows from the fact that minfa;bg·a and the last equality follows from
ffi;jgµS : Cfi;jg(E1)=0and Cfi;jg(Ep)=1 g = ; for p =1 . Regarding the last inequality, sup-
pose that
P
fi;jgµS:Cfi;jg(E1)=0 and Cfi;jg(Ep)=1 bfi;jg ¡ Kp > 0 for some p 2f 2;3;:::;rg.C o n s i d e r














































which contradicts the optimality of E1. Hence,
P
fi;jgµS:Cfi;jg(E1)=0 and Cfi;jg(Ep)=1 bfi;jg ¡ Kp · 0. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.2: From Proposition 3.1 we know that it is su¢cient to prove that the
game (N;w) is balanced. Recall that



















xECfi;jg(E) · 0 for all fi;jgµN
xE · uE(N) for all E µE
xE ¸ 0 for all E µE
yfi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN
From duality theory we know that








s.t.: ¸fi;jg + ¹fi;jg ¸ bfi;jg; for all fi;jgµN
X
fi;jgµN
¹fi;jgCfi;jg(E) · ºE +
P
fi;jg2E kfi;jg for all E µE
¸fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN
¹fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN





E be an optimal solution of (10) such that º¤
~ E > 0 for some ~ E µE (N).W e










fi;jg2 ~ E kfi;jg.S i n c e kfi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN,
we can take ¢¹fi;jg 2 [0;¹ ¤
fi;jg] such that
P
fi;jgµN:Cfi;jg( ~ E)=1¢¹fi;jg = º¤
~ E and ¢¹fi;jg =0for
all fi;jgµN with Cfi;jg( ~ E)=0 .F o r e a c h fi;jgµN,d e … n e¹fi;jg = ¹¤
fi;jg ¡ ¢¹fi;jg and
¸fi;jg =m a x fbfi;jg ¡ ¹fi;jg;0g, and for each E µE ,d e … n eº ~ E =0and ºE = º¤
E for all E µE
such that E 6= ~ E.N o t e t h a t ¸fi;jg;¹ fi;jg;º E is a feasible solution for the dual program because
¹fi;jg · ¹¤
fi;jg for all fi;jgµN. Furthermore, note that ¢¸fi;jg = ¸¤
fi;jg ¡ ¸fi;jg18
=m a x fbfi;jg ¡ ¹¤























































E be an optimal solution with º¤
E =0for all E µE(N). De…ne the allocation





fi;jg for all i 2 N. We will show that z is a core-allocation for the game
(N;w). Take S µ N. Duality theory implies that








s.t.: ¸fi;jg + ¹fi;jg ¸ bfi;jg; for all fi;jgµN
X
fi;jgµN
¹fi;jgCfi;jg(E) · ºE +
P
fi;jg2E kfi;jg for all E µE
¸fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN
¹fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN










































where the …rst equality follows from uE(S)=0if E 6µ E(S) and º¤
E =0if E µE (S) µE (N).
Hence, z is a core-allocation of the game (N;w). By using the same argument (and it can be used
by the monotonicity condition (ii) in Section 2 one can show that the game is totally balanced if19
E(U) µE(S) for all U;S µ N with U µ S. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Consider the dual of w(N) as formulated in (4). From the proof of
Theorem 3.2 we know that º¤
E =0for all E 2E(N). Hence, it holds true that










fi;jg2E kfi;jg for all E µE(N)
¸fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN
¹fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN:















The µ-part in (12) follows from the fact that T¤(S) 2E (N) for all S µ N.T o s e e t h e ¶-part,
take E µE (N) and let C(E)=fU1;U 2;:::;U mg be the maximally connected components of N
with respect to the network E. This means that the agents in Up are connected to each other while


































where the second inequality follows from the fact that T¤(Up) is a minimum cost spanning tree for
Up.
Having (12), the dual can now be reduced to










fi;jg2T¤(S) kfi;jg for all S µ N;S connected
¸fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN
¹fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN:20
Clearly, ¹fi;jg · bfi;jg and ¸fi;jg =0if ¹fi;jg ¸ bfi;jg. Consequently, it holds for an optimal dual















fi;jg2T¤(S) kfi;jg for all S µ N;S connected
¹fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN:




fi;jgµS bfi;jg for all S µ N.D e … n e
















¹fi;jg · ·(S) for all S µ N;S connected
¹fi;jg ¸ 0 for all fi;jgµN;
which proves the result. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.3: Consider a network situation where E is a tree and denote the correspond-
ing network game by (N;v). For convenience we denote the set of optimal operative networks for
coalition U with respect to (1) by E¤(U).L e t S µ T µ N and take D 2E ¤(S) and F 2E ¤(T).
Then D can be partitioned in D1 and D2 such that D1 µ F and D2 µE n F. We show that































































where the …rst equality holds since D2 [ F is a forest, the …rst inequality holds since D1 µ F and
S µ T and the last inequality from the fact that D1 [ D2 2E ¤(S). 2
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Let (N;v) be a network game corresponding to a fully public or
fully private network situation where E is a tree. Take S µ T µ Nnfkg. We will show that
v(S [f kg) ¡ v(S) · v(T [f kg) ¡ v(T). According to Lemma 4.3 we can take optimal operative
networks E¤(S);E¤(S [fkg);E¤(T);E¤(T [fkg) corresponding to coalition S;S [fkg;T;T[fkg,
respectively, such that E¤(S) µ E¤(S [f kg) µ E¤(T [f kg) and E¤(S) µ E¤(T) µ E¤(T [f kg).
De…ne the set A1 as the set of edges that is contained in E¤(S [f kg) and E¤(T), but not in
E¤(S), i.e.,
A1 = ffi;jg2Ejf i;jg2E¤(S [f kg)nE¤(S);fi;jg2E¤(T)g:
Note that A1 µE(S) is satis…ed directly in fully public but also in fully private networks.
The set A2 is the set of edges that is contained in E¤(S [f kg),b u tn o ti nE¤(S) and not in
E¤(T), i.e.,
A2 = ffi;jg2Ejf i;jg2E¤(S [f kg)nE¤(S);fi;jg6 2E¤(T)g:
Observe that the de…nitions of A1 and A2 imply that E¤(S [f kg) can be written as the union of
three disjoint sets, i.e.,
E¤(S [f kg)=E¤(S) [ A1 [ A2: (13)
Next we introduce the following notation. With A;B µEand fi;jgµN we de…ne CA
fi;jg(B)=1
if the unique path between i and j in E is contained in B and this path contains at least one link
of A;o t h e r w i s ew es e tCA
fi;jg(B)=0 .22











kij · 0: (14)
To prove (14) note that the revenues to S of the network E¤(S) [ A1 µE (S) is smaller than or
equal to the revenues to S of E¤(S),s i n c eE¤(S) is an optimal network. Hence the extra revenues








kij · 0 (15)
From equation (13) it follows that
ffi;jgµS : CA1
fi;jg(E¤(S) [ A1)=1 g =
ffi;jgµS : CA1
fi;jg(E¤(S [f kg)=1 ;CA2
fi;jg(E¤(S [f kg)=0 g;
which proves (14).
Now, we introduce the set A3, which consists of all edges in E¤(T [f kg) that are not in
E¤(S [f kg) and not in E¤(T), i.e.,
A3 = ffi;jg2Ejf i;jg2E¤(T [f kg)nE¤(T);fi;jg6 2E¤(S [f kg)g:
Observe that the de…nitions of A2 and A3 imply that E¤(T [f kg c a nb ew r i t t e na st h eu n i o n
of three disjoint sets, i.e.,
E¤(T [f kg)=E¤(T) [ A2 [ A3: (16)
Now, we have













































































































= v(T [f kg) ¡ v(T)
where the …rst equality holds by the de…nition of a network game, the second equality follows
from (13),the …rst inequality holds by (14), the second inequality is a consequence of E¤(S [fkgµ
E¤(T [f kg and the de…nition of A3, the third inequality holds by the optimality of E¤(T [f kg),
thee third equality follows from (16) and the last equality holds by the de…nition of a network
game. 2
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